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ABSTRACT 
Beyond the noise and din of the numerous #FeesMustFall campaigns, there arose deeper 
concerns of the lack of regard on display not only between protesters and institutional authorities, 
but between protesting and non-protesting students. Of course, protests by their nature are 
manifestations of perceivably unheard and unrecognised demands and plights, which make the 
flaring of tempers inevitable. But, perhaps, what defined the student protests most distinctly were 
not the impassioned calls for economic accessibility, transformation, and decolonisation, but its 
volatility, and, at times, sheer contempt. The concern of this article is to offer a conceptual 
consideration of tolerance as an educational imperative within higher education, and democracy. 
That is, if higher education is to fulfil its responsibility in relation to the public good, then it has to 
espouse those virtues that are most likely to contribute to peaceful and harmonious co-existence. 
Keywords: higher education, violence, hate speech, tolerance, democracy, educational 
imperative  
 
HIGHER EDUCATION AS SITES OF INTOLERANCE 
The concern and prevalence of intolerance in higher education takes on many different forms, 
and manifests in varying contexts and cuts across various constructions of racial, religious, 
ethnic, or economic groups. At institutional level, one finds intolerant repression of liberal and 
conservative views alike. In 2014, Anita Sarkeesian, a feminist writer, cancelled a speech at 
Utah State University after the institution received threats that a deadly shooting would take 
place if she appeared. Sarkeesian responded that she viewed this lack of tolerance, lack of 
openness to different ideas as a serious failing of higher education (Reisberg 2014). In 2015, 
Germaine Greer, another feminist and activist defied a fierce campaign to stop her delivering a 
university lecture at Cardiff University, on the grounds that she had expressed transphobic 
views. In responding to what she described as a “worrying trend”, Nicola Dandridge, chief 
executive of Universities UK, said that “One of a university’s main roles in society is to 
encourage critical thinking and vigorous debate .... Occasionally this will involve inviting 
speakers who will express contentious, even inflammatory or offensive views” (The Guardian 
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2015). In 2017, left-wing protesters threw smoke bombs and flares at far-right journalist, Milo 
Yiannopoulos, at the University of California-Berkeley. In response to this “worrying trend”, 
the American-based, Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) has coined the term 
“disinvitation” to refer to speakers, who have been disinvited, after invited to speak at 
universities (Lukianoff 2017). Between 2000 and 2017, FIRE had discovered 192 incidents in 
which students or faculty had pushed for speakers to be disinvited. Of these 192, 82 were 
successful in that the speaker did not speak. And of those 82, 53 occurred via the revocation of 
the speaker’s invitation to campus; 17 were from speakers withdrawing in the face of protest; 
and 12 were “heckler’s vetoes” in which speakers were shouted down, chased off stage, or 
otherwise prevented from speaking (Lukianoff 2017).  
Expressions of intolerance are in no way limited to invited guests. A study by Fosnacht 
and Broderick (2017) found that approximately one in four students experienced religious 
intolerance at least once in the past year, with Jewish and Muslim students being particularly 
vulnerable to religious discrimination (Bauer-Wolf 2017; Dreid 2016). In South Africa, a 
Report by the Ministerial Committee on Transformation and Social Cohesion and the 
Elimination of Discrimination in Public Higher Education Institutions revealed that while 
racism continues to be a problem in higher education, xenophobia, sexual harassment, and 
gender discrimination are equally pervasive (DoE 2008). At times, as Bothwell (2017) points 
out, it is not just that intolerance is common among university students, what is more concerning 
is that they use their university education to justify prejudices against minority groups, such as 
gays and lesbians, as is the case at institutions in China – where a number of postgraduate 
students shared the opinion, that to their “medical knowledge”, homosexuality is a “type of 
mental illness” (Bothwell 2017). Intolerance, which often descends into violence, is especially 
rife during student protests. In 2011, South Korean universities in Seoul and a number of other 
universities were destabilised by the resurgence of the call from students to reduce tuition fees 
(Kim 2011). In 2015, student protests on the streets of London against tuition fees quickly 
spiralled into violence, leading to widespread damage to property, and the subsequent arrest of 
twelve students (Hughes and Harley 2015). In turn, recent student protests on South African 
campuses against university fees, have been notably characterised by violence, wanton 
destruction to property and others. These have included arson, damage to lecture theatres, 
libraries, vehicles, statues, artworks as well as confrontations with security staff and police, 
and brutal clashes between student factions (MacGregor 2016; Hall 2016).  
There are, of course, a number of complex reasons for the current crises besetting higher 
education in South Africa. According to Badat (2010, 7) on the one hand, there is a strain 
between a number of values and goals of higher education. On the other hand, the extent to 
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which government and universities have sought to pursue social equity and redress and quality 
in higher education simultaneously, has resulted in difficult political and social dilemmas, 
which often spill over into conflict and violence. One of the main challenges is inadequate 
public finances and academic development initiatives to support under-prepared students, who 
tend to be largely black, or of working class or rural poor social origins. Much of the challenges 
and protests encountered in university spaces, as Hall (2016), explains stems from decades of 
colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, high levels of unemployment and income 
inequality. To Hall (2016), therefore, it is necessary and important to make sense of the crises 
in higher education in relation to the intersections between historical legacies and contemporary 
inequalities and inequities.  
Inasmuch as student protests have resulted in increasing levels of violence, intimidation 
and assault between students, as well as between students and academics and other university 
employees, the effects of the violence have been far-reaching.  
 
“The protesting students marched through the rain to residences across the university to gather 
numbers. Once numbers grew to around 150 students, the group moved across the campuses, 
disrupting lectures and exams. One of the exams disrupted was the Postgraduate Diploma in 
Accounting exam, where students stormed into the UCT Sports Centre and let off a fire 
extinguisher in the venue.” (Swingler 2017). 
 
In addition to the above, students have been involved in forcing students out of libraries, lecture 
theatres, disrupting examinations, and forcing non-protesting students to participate in the 
protests. While disruptions, such as these, have become synonymous with student protests, 
particularly in South Africa, what has made the latest spate of protests especially disturbing and 
distressful is the resort to intolerance, as manifested in hate speech. The University of 
Witwatersrand (Wits) has had phrases of “Kill a Jew” spray-painted on one of its main 
buildings. Also at Wits, a voice note on social media claimed that in order to get Vice-
Chancellor Professor Adam Habib’s attention, one white student would need to die. At the 
University of the Western Cape, the message “Kill All Whites” was spray-painted on university 
property. A student at the University of Cape Town student wore a t-shirt, displaying a similar 
message. To Suttner (2016), the #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall campaigns may raise 
wider questions that go beyond the educational realm and offer a lens through which we can 
look at post-1994 South Africa and ask troubling questions about the nature of this society.  
These troubling questions, as will be addressed in this article, include the importance of 
tolerance not only among students, and all individuals, but as an educational imperative, and 
necessary for human flourishing.  
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HIGHER EDUCATION AND CONTESTATIONS OF BEING AND ACTING 
Few would disagree with Davies (2015) that higher education institutions should be places of 
fierce debate, arguments over right and wrong, or with Bothwell (2017), that one of the 
frequently cited benefits of higher education is its role in producing graduates who embrace 
tolerance and progressive thinking. In an interview with Dawes (2014), Giroux contends as 
follows:  
 
“Higher education must be understood as a democratic public sphere – a space in which education 
enables students to develop a keen sense of prophetic justice, claim their moral and political 
agency, utilize critical analytical skills, and cultivate an ethical sensibility through which they 
learn to respect the rights of others. Higher education has a responsibility not only to search for 
the truth regardless of where it may lead, but also to educate students to make authority and power 
politically and morally accountable while at the same time sustaining a democratic, formative 
public culture. Higher education may be one of the few public spheres left where knowledge, 
values, and learning offer a glimpse of the promise of education for nurturing public values, critical 
hope, and a substantive democracy.” 
 
Notably, following on Giroux (in Dawes 2014), is the attention to the responsibility of higher 
education in instilling notions of “moral and political agency”, as well as moral accountability 
within students. Again, few would argue with this view, because, if nothing else, higher 
education ought to prepare students how to behave, how to respect, and how to distinguish 
between good and bad. There is an implicit societal expectation and assumption – which, of 
course, is contestable – that educated individuals ought to exercise reason, and act responsibly. 
As Pring (2013, 12) contends, the educated person, may not be academically shining, “but 
would have this sense of direction in life activities, informed by a critical sense of what is 
worthwhile, of what has wider social usefulness, and through which he or she gains a sense of 
personal worth”. The problem and difficulty, however, with the expectation that higher 
education can, and will fulfil this mandate in cultivating students, who are morally responsible, 
is three-fold.  
Firstly, state Aronowitz and Giroux (2000, 333), the corporatisation of higher education, 
has reconceptualised social issues as increasingly individual or economic considerations, 
thereby erasing democratic impulses by either devaluing them or absorbing such impulses 
within marketplace demands. In Aronowitz and Giroux’s (2000) opinion, the more corporate 
culture and values shape university life, the more corporate planning replaces social planning. 
In turn, they continue, management becomes a substitute for leadership, while the private 
domain of individual achievement replaces the discourse of public politics and social 
responsibility. Secondly, as Sandalow (1991, 150) brings to our attention, although universities 
are in many respects different, diverse, and complex institutions, the question of their apposite 
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role in shaping a social morality is part of a larger problem that our society is yet to address 
satisfactorily. He explains that the ideas that society has about moral responsibility have been 
shaped in reference to individuals, which cannot readily be transferred to institutions (Sandalow 
1991, 150). And thirdly, according to Davies (2015), higher education institutions are probably 
the worst educational sites to establish definitive duties.  
Unlike schools, universities have a larger body of students, who come from vastly diverse 
social, economic, racial and cultural identities. For the majority of students in South Africa, 
universities present the first opportunity through which they encounter students from different 
racial and cultural demographics. In turn, university life is often the first time that students leave 
the comfort and familiarity of their homes, and are introduced to the unknown rituals and 
traditions of university residences. For students, who come from historically disadvantaged 
backgrounds and schooling, the spaces of historically advantaged institutions, are particularly 
daunting and alienating. In sum, students often feel displaced from the dominant institutional 
culture, and struggle to find spaces and emotions of belonging. As a result, students are already 
in a vulnerable space, which is further complicated by stresses of financial insecurity. They 
might see protests as a last resort for assistance, and when this is not forthcoming, they might 
interpret the actions of university authorities as not only unsupportive and unsympathetic, but 
exclusionary. It is important to consider Davies’s (2015) argument that university students are 
often not really part of their community, but occupy islands of somewhat artificial activity. 
Now, if one takes into account the above three complexities, as enunciated by Aronowitz 
and Giroux (2000), Sandalow (1991), and Davies (2015), and couple these with the particular 
contexts of higher education in South Africa, then one begins to get some sense of the 
underlying anger, frustration and hopelessness that, no doubt, clouds the majority of students. 
On the face of it, the series of protests that have, at times, paralysed higher education 
institutions, is about free education, and hence, equal opportunity, and the promise of a gateway 
to economic prosperity. But the desire for free education is neither the source nor the solution 
to the anger festering in the language and physical displays of intolerance. There are bigger and 
deeper issues at play here. These are issues fuelled by generational forms of alienation, 
colonisation, and dehumanisation. What the protests are a reflection of, is anger against an 
unrealised democracy. Promises of a better life have been made, wrongs were supposed to be 
corrected, but more than two decades later, very little has changed for most South Africans – 
leading Badat (2016, 19) to refer to the protests as “a dramatic reminder of unfinished business 
in higher education”. Indeed, as violence and intimidation became a common occurrence at 
universities, so, too, the list of demands became longer and longer – from free tuition, and free 
accommodation, to free meals, after-hours transportation, and condoms.  
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 Higher education cannot and should by no means be expected to fulfil the myriad social 
demands invoked by protesting students. Higher education cannot be a surrogate welfare state. 
Higher education cannot be responsible, or held to ransom for what are clearly political and 
socio-economic problems, and often beyond the brief and ambit of university authorities. If 
students are calling for free education, then the state needs to be held to account for, and to that 
call. Similarly, if students are resorting to wanton acts of violence, which includes the burning 
of buildings and assault of their peers, then, these, too, are not problems only for higher 
education. These actions are infringements on societal norms and regulations, and cannot be 
treated as if they are not criminal acts.  
What higher education, however, should be called out on, and held accountable for, is its 
increasingly volatile and intolerant educational spaces, and its impact and responsibility not 
only to its on-campus communities, but to the communities in which it finds itself. In other 
words, universities cannot afford to be dismissive or non-responsive in the face of intolerant 
hate speech, and intimidation. These forms of violation and humiliation hold deep implications 
for democracy, in that it inevitably festers into more intolerance, hatred and disregard for the 
other. The irony is that inasmuch as student protests have spilled over into calls for the 
decolonisation of education, the epistemic violence inflicted through colonisation, is alive and 
well in the violence of students. And unless, higher education takes (epistemic) stock of its 
moral responsibility in nurturing students, who act with humanity, moral responsibility and 
compassion in relation to themselves and others, the violent legacies of colonisation and 
apartheid will continue to thrive. As I will argue in the ensuing sections of this article, higher 
education institutions, therefore, have to become spaces of regard for the other, and this regard 
has to be imbibed in conceptions of tolerance as an educational imperative. 
 
WHY TOLERANCE? 
Generally, when we think of tolerance, we associate it with patience and open-mindedness.  In 
the Socratic sense, tolerance is synonymous with pursing truth, and being prepared to consider 
the truths of others. Being prepared to consider that there are other ways of seeing and 
understanding the world, implies an understanding that the world is necessarily a place of 
disagreement, and at times, conflict. In other words, disagreement and conflict are not 
necessarily signs of discontent, disharmony and friction, but rather that competing views are 
indeed being engaged and debated. To exercise tolerance in relation to differences of opinion, 
therefore, is, as Murphy (1997, 596), describes, to show “the self-restraint of not restricting or 
reducing the rights or autonomy of others, or other ways of being and acting”. In a similar 
fashion, Fiala (2002, 103) defines tolerance as a pragmatic response to the practical need to 
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coexist with others who have different conceptions of the good. According to Fiala (2002, 103), 
tolerance “develops out of the recognition that in practice diversity cannot be eradicated by 
either philosophical argument or political force”. Rather, individuals and society have to 
consciously work at allowing voices of competing views, and to accept that consensus on these 
views, are not necessarily a goal.  
To Gutmann (1987, 304), tolerance is an act “agreeing to disagree about beliefs and 
practices that are a matter of basic liberty”. This, states Gutmann (1987) serves as a way to 
expand and extend participation of people as civic equals in such encounters. She maintains 
that once an individual has agreed to disagree in educational encounters, the possibility exists 
to recognise publicly one another’s political, cultural and religious differences (Gutmann 1987, 
305). In this way, tolerance and recognition of differences are inseparable acts of human 
behaviour. To Gutmann (1987, 304), tolerance prevents the imposition of any single substantive 
systems of beliefs and practices on all others, because in showing tolerance, an individual 
recognises that others hold different perspectives on the world and on themselves. The argument 
being made here, is that exercising tolerance is contingent upon the capacity of humans to agree 
to disagree about matters that influence them. In other words, the very idea of tolerance infers 
an understanding that people cannot be expected to be in agreement about everything or 
everyone, and more importantly, that people have the right to express their disagreement or 
difference. 
Following Gutmann (1987), tolerance can be understood as an imperative for both civic 
and moral equality. That is, to show regard for divergent views is not limited to practices of 
civil engagement. Rather, to act with tolerance is to afford and affirm the equal rights of all 
individuals to lay claim to what they consider as their truths. This does not mean that tolerance 
should be (mis)interpreted as a licence for people to simply say and do as they please. Students, 
for example, even in their most frustrated moments, cannot be allowed to vandalise university 
property, or spew hate speech, and then claim these as legitimate forms of protest. As Gutmann 
(1987, 308) clarifies, tolerating all people is conditional upon a concern that differences should 
not be of such a nature that it could result in people doing harm to one another. For this reason, 
Walzer (1997) describes tolerance as the key virtue for peaceful co-existence and a necessary 
condition for human flourishing, while Fiala (2002, 103) defines tolerance as a pragmatic 
response to the practical need to coexist with others who have different conceptions of the good.  
In continuing, tolerance, contends Walzer (1997), does not suggest the agreement with or 
acceptance of another’s perspective or truth. A preparedness or willingness to engage with 
another perspective, does not mean that one accepts that perspective. In this sense, there might 
be shared understandings that students should not be prevented from pursuing higher education 
Davids Tolerance as an imperative for higher education and democracy 
69 
due to financial constraints – that is, that all students should be afforded equal social and 
economic opportunities. Within this shared agreement, there is acceptance of one another’s 
actions or practices. Notions of tolerance only enter the debate when there is disagreement about 
how the desire for equal opportunities might be attained – for example, whether preventing 
students from writing their examinations is an acceptable form of protest. Here, the argument 
might be that all students ought to make sacrifices so that the greater good (of free higher 
education) might be reached. In turn, the counter argument might be that inasmuch as students 
have the right to protest, others have the right not to participate in the protest. In other words, 
tolerance only comes into play when there are differences of opinion. It is only through 
disagreement or dissensus that the need for tolerance arises – that is, tolerance emanates from 
divergence and difference. According to MacIntyre (2006, 289), the urgency of tolerance often 
manifests in the minor confrontations, contending interests, unremitting suspicions and 
diversity of standpoints involving human agency.  
Following the above explications, tolerance is limited to the recognition of people’s 
competing conceptions of the good life for as long as such conceptions do not result in doing 
harm to others. To this end, tolerance does not imply an uncritical and disengaged acceptance 
of whatsoever. One cannot make an argument for tolerating violence and intimidation, when 
such acts have the potential to bring about harm. As an educational imperative, tolerance has to 
be enacted as a reflective practice in relation to oneself and others – affording due regard to 
diverse ways of thinking, being, and acting (Davids and Waghid 2017). 
 
TOLERANCE AS AN EDUCATIONAL IMPERATIVE  
In a Foucauldian sense, higher education, as powerful sites of learning, will never be without 
resistance. Knowledge, and knowledge production, are always immersed in power. As Giroux 
(in Giroux and Samalavicius 2016) contends, higher education is not simply about educating 
young people to be smart, socially responsible and adequately prepared for whatever notions of 
the future they can imagine, but that higher education is central to democracy itself. In this 
regard, the real challenge for higher education, argues Giroux (1992, 7), is to extend its 
definition beyond “the more vital imperatives of educating students to live in a multicultural 
world, to face the challenge of reconciling difference and community, and to address what it 
means to have a voice in shaping one’s future as part of a broader task of enriching and 
extending the imperatives of democracy and human rights on both a national and global level”. 
Such an understanding, according to Giroux (1992, 7), makes students attentive to their own 
roles and responsibilities in relation to human suffering; it makes them more inclined towards 
compassion and empathy.  
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What, therefore, can institutions of higher education do in order to ensure that students are 
attentive to their own implication in particular forms of human suffering – such as when hate 
speech is scrawled across campus walls? What types of teaching and learning should take shape 
so that all students are not only included, but that any form of marginalisation and exclusion, is 
collectively guarded against by all? How should universities extend the imperatives of a 
democracy, so that students know how to be, and act in a democracy? In the concluding sections 
of this article, I explore the importance of tolerance as an educational imperative, and depart 
from a premise that an educational encounter should necessarily be shaped by practices of 
deliberation and engagement – that is, where students are invited to critically engage with their 
own teaching and learning, without coercion, and without fear of reprisal. 
Implicit within the conceptions of tolerance, as highlighted in this article, is an assumption 
that an individual exercises his or her conscience on the basis of his or her own autonomous 
self. This implies that an individual is free to act in an unhindered way, while also having an 
awareness that this freedom or autonomy would need to be harnessed or inhibited in relation to 
others (Davids and Waghid 2017). A teacher, for example, might have particular religious 
beliefs or affiliations. These beliefs might constrain and prejudice how he or she views 
individuals from other religious affiliations. In a certain context, when he or she is with those, 
who share these particular beliefs, it might be in order for him or her to express these views. 
But, in a different context, such as a classroom, it might be inappropriate or downright offensive 
for him or her to verbalise these views. In this way, the context of the encounter influences the 
autonomy of the teacher – that is, whether he or she has the autonomy to express him or herself 
in an unhindered manner. Similarly, a university teacher might have particular dissident views 
on LGBTQI students, but would need to constrain these views in the classroom, so as not to 
cause umbrage to others.  
Exercising tolerance of conscience is thus tantamount to an action of will on the grounds 
that the individual is prepared to constrain his or her speech and feelings in relation to others 
about a particular matter, say, in an educational encounter (Davids and Waghid 2017). In this 
regard, Oshana (1998, 81) maintains, “autonomy is a condition of persons constituted, in large 
part, by the external, social relations people find themselves in (or the absence of certain social 
relations)”. The autonomous person, states Oshana (1998, 82), formulates certain goals, which 
are constructed according to particular values, desires and convictions that have developed in 
an uncoerced and conscious fashion (Oshana, 1998, 82). When individuals attune themselves 
to particular values, they are, according to Pring (2013), able to recognise others as well as 
themselves as individuals – capable of understanding, seeking personal fulfilment, and worthy 
of respect.  
Davids Tolerance as an imperative for higher education and democracy 
71 
Following the above, students should be made aware that inasmuch as they have the right 
to embark on protest, as an enactment of their autonomy, they also need to understand that their 
actions need to be informed by practical reasoning or rationality. In other words, their actions, 
which constitute their exercise of autonomy, have to be enacted, with due regard for the other. 
A student, for example, through practical reasoning, would know, that wearing a t-shirt, 
emblazoned with hate speech, might cause harm to another. By enacting his or her autonomy 
to wear the t-shirt, he or she might alienate another. Alienation is incommensurate with human 
flourishing, and contradistinctive to peaceful co-existence, and, therefore, should be guarded 
against within any setting (Davids and Waghid 2017)  
If we agree with Giroux (in Giroux and Samalavicius 2016), that higher education is 
central to democracy, then the focus has to be on the cultivation of contesting voices and spaces, 
without the intention of harm and wilful alienation. One way of doing this, is what MacIntyre 
(1999, 27) describes as exercising rational agency to make judgements based on powers of 
perception, identification and re-identification. The importance of teachers listening to students, 
and students listening to others, is not so much about the sharing of experiences as it is about 
the capacity it holds for helping us to understand ourselves in relation to those who shape our 
relationships (Davids  2016). To MacIntyre (1999, 30), exercising independent rational choices 
on the grounds of articulating autonomous “speech acts” involves making assertions, and 
expressing doubts through asking questions. Secondly, for MacIntyre (1999, 14), practical 
rationality requires of humans to engage with others so that might make sense of their speech, 
and come to understand the perspectives of others – thereby, embarking on activities “in concert 
and communication with others” (MacIntyre 1999, 51).  
The idea of engaging with others on the basis of practical rationality, argues MacIntyre 
(1999, 84), is linked to an understanding that although humans have the capability to reach their 
own conclusions, they can also be held accountable for those conclusions. Stated differently, 
practical rationality can be described as humans simply using their common sense. In this way, 
an acknowledgement of autonomous human action is inextricably linked to a dependence on 
others for their intelligible contributions. Thirdly, to MacIntyre (1999, 54), exercising practical 
rationality is an ability to stand back from one’s initial opinions and judgements, and to 
reconsider how things might be otherwise in relation to other and competing judgements. This 
implies that once one has proffered reasons in defence of a particular argument, one also 
demonstrates an ability to distance oneself from one’s earlier reasons because one is capable to 
come up with more imaginative reasons for different possible futures (MacIntyre 1999, 74). 
This ability reveals a capacity not only to shift in one’s thinking, but to imagine a different 
future. It is possible, therefore, for students to make their challenges and concerns known and 
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attended to, without a resort to violent protest.  
A student, for example, might use violence as a means of protest, but then upon re-
evaluating the consequences, as in destroyed libraries and lecture theatres, might realise that 
violence might not be the best path of action. Or, he or she might violate others through 
offensive slogans, but when confronted with similar vile statements regarding his or her own 
identity, might begin to know the pain of hate speech. It is therefore critical to higher education 
that spaces and opportunities are created and cultivated where students are allowed to bring 
their perceptions, worldviews, and prejudices into the room. When students are prepared to 
bring their prejudices and conflicts into an educative setting, they should be equally prepared 
to listen to those, who have divergent views, or have rebuttals to their prejudices. In other words, 
as Mouffe (2005) argues, students should not be denied the right to engage in agonistic 
contestation. To Mouffe (2000), agonistic pluralism presents a new way to think about 
democracy that is different from the traditional liberal conception of democracy as a negotiation 
among interests.  
While one desires sites and encounters free from conflict and antagonism, if one accepts 
that students are autonomous beings, who ought to think for themselves, then teaching and 
learning have to accommodate the possibility that disagreement may appear, and therefore, have 
to provide spaces where differences can be confronted. As Todd and Säfström (2008, 3) assert, 
antagonistic conflicts are necessary for democracy; they give meaning to democratic politics, 
because they allow for the emergence and engagement of different truths. In other words, if 
students are to learn how to act and be in a democracy, then higher education has to nurture 
both the site and the expression of that democracy, without, however, abandoning the liberal 
democratic framework completely (Todd 2011). While students should be encouraged to voice 
their disagreement and prejudices, so that these might be discussed and debated, the democratic 
framework demands that even within conflict and disagreement, the moral responsibility of 
regard for the other persists. In this sense, higher education institutions do not simply prepare 
students to become democratic citizens, rather they introduce them to what Todd and Säfström 
(2008, 8) refer to as “the political aspects of existing in plural states, which means facing 
disagreement on political instead of moral terms”.  
In conclusion, I have argued that if one of the desired outcomes of higher education is to 
develop students and by implication, citizens, who are able to think for themselves, without 
coercion or coercing others, then, tolerance as an educational premise has to be informed by 
particular understandings of individual autonomy and rationality. Too often, students enter 
particular deliberations and disputes, not because of personal worldviews or persuasions, but 
because of other influences and pressures. It is therefore not unusual to hear students justifying 
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certain articulations on the basis of others’ beliefs and actions. In this regard, I have argued that 
individual autonomy and rationality are imperative to tolerant action, and in turn, that tolerance 
is imperative to what it means to educate, and to be educated. Students have to be afforded the 
necessary opportunities to engage in classroom deliberations whereby they are able to cultivate 
their individual autonomy through the exercise of rationality. To this end, students might be 
more inclined to speak out against expressions and practices of intolerance, and hence be in a 
better position to serve the greater purposes of higher education, which ought to be couched in 
moral responsibility to and for all people.  
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